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Introduction
Modern cosmology attempts to predicate 
the universe in rubrics of the given laws of 
physics. In spite of the fact that cosmology does 
not account for the contingent facticity of these 
laws, it attempts to speculate about “creation” of 
the universe as if the contingent facticity of the 
material content of the universe as well as physical 
laws could be explained. In this paper we discuss 
one of such cosmological models proposed by 
Stephen Hawking subjecting it to a philosophical 
and theological critique. This critique arises from 
a perennial “negative certitude” of philosophy 
that the contingent facticity of the world cannot 
be explained and that any speculation in this 
respect leads to a theological stance that the 
ultimate foundation of the world originates in its 
otherness. The paper starts with a brief account 
of the Christian concept of creation of the world 
out of nothing and then a general predicament of 
any scientific attempt to “model” such a creation, 
referring to the first Kant’s antinomy. Then the 
Hawking model is analyzed philosophically 
with the reference to neo-Platonic and patristic 
sources, leading to the reformulation of the 
antinomial predicament not in terms of the 
temporal origin of the universe, but in terms 
of the absolutely necessary being. Thus it is 
established that modern cosmology provides an 
interesting example of the metamorphosis of the 
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Kantian antinomies, reflecting the encapsulation 
of the unity of the human cognitive faculties in 
the cosmological discourse. 
Creation of the World in Theology 
The Christian teaching on creation out of 
nothing, its doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, did not 
enter the cultural and spiritual environment of 
the ancient world in an empty background. The 
world-view asserted by Classical Hellenistic 
philosophy that the world exists necessarily, that 
is, there is no need for justification of the very fact 
of the existence of the world, had a deep impact. 
Greek thought could not cross this line of inquiry 
about the nature of things that was the foundation 
of all foundations in its philosophical meditation 
about the cosmos. The world, according to the 
Greeks, was permanent, unchangeable and, 
despite all internal movements, such as the origin 
and decay of things, the world as a whole was 
in a state of “eternal return”; its cosmology was 
cyclic. The endurance of the cosmos of the Greeks 
was ontologically necessary; the premise of its 
existence was an absolute fact, the last resort of 
all possible philosophizing.
The message of the Bible and the doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo, which was developed by the 
Fathers of Christian church who challenged Greek 
philosophy and cosmology by affirming that the 
cosmos cannot be regarded as a self-explanatory 
being (May, 1994). Rather, it is dependent on the 
existence of God and hence cannot be described 
as eternal, for its dependence on God means that 
the world is different from God and that its mode 
of existence, being different from the divine, 
is finite in all possible senses of the word (for 
example, temporal): if God is infinite, then the 
world is finite. The world is created by God and 
in its matter is radically different from God.
The Christian message affirmed two 
fundamentals with respect to the relationship 
between God and the world: the world’s radical 
contingency upon God, which implied that the 
laws established in the world are contingent and 
do not possess a status of an absolute necessity. 
This implied that the act of creation of the world 
by God out of nothing is a “free” act of God’s 
willing kindness to the world and, because of 
God’s freedom, the creation is not inherent 
in God’s own being. This produces a twofold 
contingency: contingency on the side of the orders 
in the universe, which could not have existed at all, 
and contingency on the side of the God-Creator, 
who could not have created anything at all. As 
a accompanying result, the dualism of Classical 
Greek philosophy, in which there was a separation 
between the intelligible and the sensible worlds, 
was overcome: the whole universe, intelligible 
and sensible, heavenly and celestial, was regarded 
as creation, as penetrated through with a unitary 
rational order of a contingent kind, which can be 
studied only in accordance with its own nature 
and yet is able through the order and harmony in 
the cosmos to point to the creator.1 
To summarize, Christian teaching on 
creation represents an immense shift from Greek 
philosophical monism toward an ontology of 
the created being, which has its own foundation 
in its otherness, that is, in God, whose mode 
of existence is ontologically distinct from that 
mode of existence of the created world. From a 
theological point of view, the concept of creation 
has sense as the concept of the relationship 
between God and the world, rather than about 
the world alone. This implies that if science 
(cosmology, for example) attempts to predicate 
about the creation of the universe, it can do 
so only from within the immanent aspects of 
the world, which are accessible to scientific 
investigation. This means that it is doubtful from 
the very beginning that science can provide a 
model of creation of the world out of nothing 
that could compete with or simply be leveled to 
that of the theological teaching about creation. 
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It would be a challenge for science to try to 
uncover the signs of the transcendent present 
in the world. This would mean that “creation in 
cosmology”, understood discursively, could in 
principle refer to that aspect of the theological 
creatio ex nihilo that is associated with the 
hidden rationality of a contingent origin, the 
rationality that is inherent in God. This leads to 
the conclusion that the understanding of creation, 
if attempted from within science as a challenge 
to a theological view, should address not only the 
origination of the material universe, its evolution, 
and its sustenance but also the question of its 
rationality and purposive ability inherent in 
humans to communicate with the universe and to 
contemplate this rationality. 
Cosmology can become an instrument 
which helps to reveal the features of necessity in 
the contingent facticity of the created universe, 
but in no way it can replace the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo for its objective is to explicate 
the world structure from the point of view of 
physics, that is as a-priori given set of efficient 
causality. The question about the very reasons 
for existence of elementary matter forms, as well 
as laws which govern it, cannot be addressed by 
cosmology because the laws which express the 
specific and concrete being of matter cannot 
enlighten the underlying causes of its very being. 
The laws of nature provide us with some tools of 
explicating the necessary feature of these laws, 
but they cannot address the issue of the facticity 
of these laws. The world is given and described 
in terms of some laws, but these laws cannot 
describe why this world is such as we have it, 
but not the other. The coming into existence of 
the universe and of its laws remains a subject 
of the theological teaching on creatio ex nihilo. 
Let us now illustrate this general intuition by 
considering one cosmological theory attempting 
to interpret “creation of the universe out of 
nothing”. 
Origin of the Universe:  
the Dichotomy between  
Cosmological Evolution  
and Initial Conditions as Explication  
of Kant’s First Cosmological Antinomy
We should start by recalling that cosmology, 
being a part of classical physics, takes for granted 
that the description of physical processes in the 
universe is made in terms of space and time. 
Cosmology uses Einstein’s General Relativity in 
order to model the spatio-temporal continuum of 
the universe (space and time are relational upon 
matter content, so that spatio-temporal dynamics 
in the universe is linked to matter). This implies 
that if cosmology were to attempt to explain the 
origin of space and time it would imply also 
an explanation of the origin of matter in the 
universe.
This presents a real challenge for cosmology, 
for this kind of explanation would definitely 
transcend physics. To explain the origination of 
matter and space time from “something” which 
is not matter and not space-time is probably an 
inconceivable task for physics, which is based 
on the classical concept of causation. In order 
to explain the origin of matter and space-time 
cosmology would have to model the transition 
from a philosophically understood “nothing” (no-
thing in an absolute sense, not a physical vacuum) 
to something (fields, particles, space-time). 
This kind of modelling is an improper thing for 
cosmology to do; it rather demands a philosophical 
(or theological) logic, when the creation of matter 
and space-time would be expressed in terms of 
their relation to a transcendent source.
Correspondingly, in view of this general 
understanding, classical cosmology experiences 
difficulties when it attempts to speculate about 
the temporal origin of the visible cosmos. This 
problem is inherent for cosmology which affirms 
that the universe experiences expansion. Since 
the dynamics of this expansion is described by 
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the Einstein equations (for the universal scale 
factor a (radius of the universe) as a function 
of cosmological time t), the extrapolation of the 
solution of these equations backward in time 
leads inevitably to such a point where t = 0 and 
α = 0. This point in the evolution of the universe 
is associated with the beginning of the universe, 
the point beyond which physics and cosmology 
can not proceed, for most of the classical concepts 
loose their sense2.
If cosmological theory, by extrapolating 
the expansion of the universe backward in time, 
would predict that all physical matter and space-
time disappears at the point of the ‘beginning’, 
then there would be a temptation to announce 
that the point of the beginning is the absolute 
origin of the universe in terms of both space 
and time, that is, no thing was before this point 
in terms of the cosmological time t. In reality, 
however, the situation is completely opposite, 
that is the values of all physical parameters ( 
such as density of matter, curvature of space-
time etc.) reach infinity at the point of beginning. 
It is because of this that the initial state of the 
classical universe is called the Big Bang, or 
cosmological singularity. Both matter and 
space-time experience extraordinary behavior 
at this point, which is hardly to be described by 
physics, and there is no ground to claim that there 
was nothing at the singularity; on the contrary 
since all physical quantities are infinite, that is, 
indefinite there, no particular specification of 
the initial state is possible at all, all hypotheses 
will be untestable.
The appearance of infinities in cosmology is 
inevitable if one assumes the classical forms of 
matter in the universe, such as radiation and dust.3 
Cosmology with classical forms of matter leads 
to a series of problems, which can be overcome 
if one invokes the presence in the universe of 
“non-classical” matter, such as quantum fields 
described in modern parlance either as inflaton 
(Ф), or ‘cosmological “constant” Λ. In these 
models the dynamics of the universe is driven 
either by decaying inflaton Ф or cosmological 
“constant” Λ.4 Formally inflationary cosmology 
succeeds in removing the singularity at t = 0 and 
placing it in the asymptotic limit t → – ∞, so that 
the problem of the beginning of the universe is 
converted into the problem of its pre-existence in 
infinite time. The preexistent vacuum state decays 
in time driving the evolution of the universe to its 
present state. The only advantage of this model 
is that the average energy of the vacuum state, 
which is given by Λ, is finite at all times so that 
this cosmological model allows one to avoid a 
bizarre conclusion about the apocalyptic state 
of matter and geometry at the Big Bang. 5 It can 
clearly be seen that if one talks about “creation” 
of the universe in this case, this is the production 
of matter not out of nothing, but out of matter 
described either by Ф or by Λwhose pre-existence 
is postulated. 
In both cases, that is of cosmology with 
classical matter or inflationary cosmology, physics 
fails to explain the nature of the initial condition 
for the equations which drive cosmological 
evolution. The dichotomy between the laws 
of dynamics and the initial conditions which 
fix a specific outcome of these laws acquires 
some unique features in cosmology. Since we 
can speculate on the nature of these conditions 
only from within our universe by extrapolating 
backward the properties of the observable 
universe, the ‘knowledge’ of the initial conditions 
thus achieved does not tell us anything about the 
genuine nature of these conditions, as if there 
were special physical laws responsible for these 
conditions, separated from us in the past and not 
being similar to laws of dynamics. Being bounded 
by the universe in which we live we cannot know 
the laws of the initial conditions of the universe; 
for this would require us to transcend beyond the 
universe, which is impossible.
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The ideal variant for cosmologists wishing 
to describe the creation of matter in the universe 
would be to construct an initial state such that the 
total energy of matter would be equal zero and 
this requirement would be a meta-law, imposed 
on the matter of the universe in the pre-existent 
space and time. This kind of a model was offered 
by Tryon.6 The major feature of this model is that 
the universe originates in preexistent space and 
time as a result of a fluctuation of the physical 
vacuum (a state of quantum matter in which the 
values of all observables are zero). Geometrically 
the development of the universe can be presented 
as a future light cone, whose apex is positioned 
completely arbitrary in preexistent space and 
time. This constitutes a philosophical difficulty 
with this model: it is impossible to specify and 
justify why the universe originated at a specific 
point of space and time. The spontaneous creation 
of the universe (as a result of a fluctuation) could 
occur anywhere and at any moment of time. 
This means in turn that the variety of different 
universes could originate at different locations 
of preexistent space-time, driving cosmology to 
face a serious problem of the mutual influence of 
different universes (See Fig. 1). 
It is obvious that this kind of model has 
nothing to do with creation out of nothing in 
a theological sense, for space, time, quantum 
vacuum as well as physics behind the fluctuation, 
are all assumed to be pre-existent. It is rather 
reasonable to talk here about the temporal 
origination of the universe rather than about its 
creation out of nothing.
It is interesting to note that the first 
‘scientific’ ideas on the origination of the 
universe in pre-existent space and time were 
proposed by Newton who intended to reconcile 
the Biblical account of creation, where the 
world had to have a beginning, with his view 
that time could have neither beginning nor end. 
Newton asserted that the visible universe was 
brought into existence by God in the past which 
is separated from us by finite time, but this took 
place within the absolute and infinite space 
and time. The creation of matter is detached 
in his model from the creation of time. We see 
here a fundamental difference from General 
Relativity, where space and time are relational 
upon matter and the split in origination of 
matter and time seems to be theoretically 
inconsistent. 7
Fig. 1. Indeterminacy of “creation” of the universe in cosmology with preexistent spase and time
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The logical difficulty with this kind of model 
is connected with our inability to locate the 
moment of time where the universe originated, 
from outside, by transcending beyond the universe 
itself, into its imaginable preexistent «before». 
We can argue about the beginning of time within 
the visible universe by extrapolating its expansion 
backward in time. But this will never allow us to 
claim scientifically that there either was or was 
not preexistent time «before» our universe came 
into existence.8 This situation was described by 
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason in the first 
cosmological antinomy (A 426-427/ B454-455 
[ET: p. 396]): 
Thesis: The world has a beginning 
in time and is also limited as regards 
space;
Antithesis: The world has no 
beginning and no limits in space; it is 
infinite as regards both time and space.
In modern terms, the thesis corresponds to 
the view that the universe as we know it is unique 
and the Big Bang is an absolute beginning of 
the universe, as well as time and space. There 
are no reasonable arguments about existence of 
anything beyond our universe and ‘prior’ to the 
Big Bang; the latter is the absolute beginning 
of being. Any attempt to speculate about the 
‘outside’ and ‘before’ the universe, would be, in 
a spirit of the Kantian philosophy, an ambitious 
attempt of reason to depart from the empirical 
series of causation, corresponding to the visible 
universe, towards purely intelligible series which 
have different ontology in comparison with the 
physical universe.
The antithesis corresponds to the model of the 
universe with preexistent time and space, where 
the visible universe is one particular realisation 
of a potentially infinite number of existing 
universes, corresponding to different initial 
conditions at different moments of preexistent 
time. Because of the impossibility of locating 
the point of origination of our universe in the 
preexistent time and hence of making this point 
special, one cannot claim that there is no time and 
space beyond the visible universe. It can originate 
at any moment of preexistent time so that there 
could pass potentially infinite time before the 
visible universe came into being. All points of 
preexistent space and time are equivalent; space 
and time is uniform and infinite.
One can look at the same antinomy from 
a different perspective. For example, the thesis 
can be treated as the affirmation that the visible 
universe is unique, whereas the antithesis 
as the opposite, i.e. that the visible universe, 
being finite in terms of its temporal past, is one 
particular representative out of the ensemble of 
the universes with different boundary conditions, 
that is, at different moments of their origination 
in preexistent time. In this setting the antinomial 
nature of any propositions about the origination of 
the visible universe in preexistent time becomes 
evident: on the one hand we can not transcend 
our universe in order to assert scientifically 
that we are a part of the big ensemble of the 
universes; on the other hand nothing can stop 
us from making a Platonic-like assumption that 
there is the ensemble of the universes, which 
we cannot verify empirically, but which we can 
affirm as intelligible entities. In this case the 
whole meaning of the antinomy reveals itself 
as predication about two ontologically distinct 
realities, i.e. the empirical visible universe and 
the Platonic ensemble of the universes.
The presence of such an antinomy in 
cosmology with preexistent time points to the 
fundamental ontological difference (diaphora) 
between the empirical and intelligible, which is 
inevitably invoked by the reason when it tries 
to speculate about the origins of the world. The 
antinomy points towards the conceptual and 
ontological difference between the empirical time 
in the visible universe and Platonic- like time in 
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the preexistent, but rather conceptual universe. 
The attempt to explain the origination of the 
visible universe out of an ensemble of possible 
universes, can then be interpreted as a conceptual 
causation from the world of ideas to the empirical 
world. This indicates not the creation of the 
universe itself, but rather a special aspect of 
the created realm, its structural differentiation 
between the empirical and intelligible. 
Thus one can draw a preliminary 
conclusion that all models of origination of the 
universe in pre-existent time will never explain 
the origination in empirical, scientific terms, 
rather they will indicate instead a problem of the 
dualism between the evolution of the observable 
universe (which follows the laws of dynamics, 
testable in principle) and its initial conditions 
(which are untestable in principle and which 
rather belong to the realm of metaphysics). One 
can refer to E. McMullin who commented that 
the spontaneous, uncaused origination of the 
universe, such as that proposed in the model of 
Tryon, can not be a “creation” in a proper sense, 
for the cause of creation, that is, a creator, (which 
must be outside of the chain of spatio-temporal 
events in the universe) can not be present in 
the physical theory. This means that the desire 
to justify “creation” in cosmology leads to 
causation in a rather philosophical sense, so 
that a scientist is leaning towards philosophical 
ideas, or even theology (McMullin 1988, p. 46).
The unsatisfactory nature of the assumption 
that the universe was created in (preexistent) 
time was realised as early as the Patristic writes 
who defended the concept of creation of the world 
ex nihilo. Basil the Great, in his Hexaemeron 
(“The Commentary on Six Days of Creation”) 
I: 5, made a distinction between creation of the 
intelligible world with no temporal flux and no 
spatial dimension, and the creation of the visible 
universe together with “the succession of time, 
for ever passing on and passing away and never 
stopping in its course” (Basil the Great 1996, 
p. 54). Basil asserts that the meaning of the 
Biblical phrase “In the beginning God created” 
must be understood as “in the beginning of 
time” (Ibid., p. 55), that is, God created the 
visible world together with time, and it was 
the beginning of time in the visible world. In a 
different passage Basil argues that the creation 
of the world was not a spontaneous origination, 
i.e. conception by chance, but, on the contrary, 
it was created with a purpose and reason (Ibid, 
p. 55). In order to articulate the a-temporal 
nature of “the beginning of the world”, and to 
remove any causation at the beginning in terms 
of time-series, Basil affirms that “the beginning, 
in effect, is indivisible and instantaneous...the 
beginning of time is not yet time and no even 
the least particle of it.” (Ibid., p. 55). 
Similarly to Basil, Augustine in his 
Confessions, XI addressed the problem of the 
origin of time directly, affirming similarly to 
Basil, and using quite contemporary words, 
that: “The way, God, in which you made heaven 
and earth was not that you made them either 
in heaven or on earth....Nor did you make the 
universe within the framework of the universe. 
There was nowhere for it to be made before it was 
brought into existence” (Augustine 1991, p. 225). 
The last sentence is a proper theological reaction 
to any cosmology with preexistent time. If we 
attempt to talk about creation of the universe out 
of nothing in cosmology, it means that we can 
not use for this the cosmological models where 
the visible universe originates in the “large 
universe”, preexistent with respect to the visible 
one. Similarly, in the City of God XI: 6, Augustine 
asserts that the universe was not created by God 
in time, but was created with time. Augustine 
affirmed the creation of the universe and time 
within it as the only consistent expression of the 
Christian affirmation of the creatio ex nihilo. The 
nihilo could not be something, it could not have 
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any attributes of the created things, it must be 
absolute philosophical no-thing. In particular it is 
not in time and space.
It is clear then that if cosmology hopes to 
challenge the theological teaching on creatio ex 
nihilo it must at least refuse any models of the 
universe with pre-existent time. In other words, 
time itself must be explained as a result of 
cosmological theory. This sounds suspicious at 
first glance, for any physical theory assumes time 
as necessary background where the dynamics and 
change take place. A reasonable starting point in 
this attempt, however, is to find such models of 
the universe where the initial state will manifest 
a global space-like singularity, so that it will not 
require any assumptions about preexistent time. 
The initiation of the visible universe takes place at 
this singularity, so that empirical time originates 
at this singularity and the universe can be said 
to be created not in time but in the pre-existent 
space of the singularity.
If one assumes that there is a variety of initial 
conditions at the global spatial singularity, then 
the “physics’ of this variety is very problematic 
again. One can produce very exotic theories 
about the global initial space, but it will have a 
limited impact for the verifiability of this theory 
in the visible universe whose initial conditions are 
posed only in a tiny domain of the global surface, 
and that is why any proposal for the nature of a 
global singularity which covers all possible initial 
conditions would be untestable from within the 
visible universe 9.
At any rate the model of the origination of 
the visible universe from the global space-like 
singularity assumes that there was a finite time 
back when the observable universe came into 
existence and started to develop to its present 
state. Time was brought into existence together 
with the universe, and the problem of positioning 
of our universe in preexistent time is not present 
in such a scenario. At the same time, if the global 
singularity is assumed to be in existence prior to 
what we call our universe, it is difficult to assert 
that the universe was created out of nothing, 
for the point of origination of the universe is 
positioned at the initial singularity which is not 
nothing in a theological sense but preexistent 
space. It is clear then that one can apply the 
same argument, which we used before in the 
context of an antinomial proposition similar to 
the first antinomy of Kant, where the term time is 
omitted. From a philosophical point of view the 
difficulty of predicating the origin of the universe 
in terms of different initial conditions in space 
is of the same kind at it was before for models 
with preexistent time. This implies that the next 
logical step would be to attempt to modify the 
theory in order to remove all pre-existent entities, 
such as time or space, and to construct the model 
of the universe, where space and time would 
originate together with matter. Can this ambition 
be realized in cosmology?
In order to make clearer what kind of problem 
we face here, let us compare the dynamics of 
particle in classical mechanics on the one hand, 
and the dynamics of the universe in general 
relativity on the other hand. The fundamental 
difference between classical mechanics and 
general relativity, is that there is no preexistent 
time in the latter case. Space in general relativity 
is a relational concept, its dynamics follows the 
dynamics of matter, and it is a 3-dimensional 
space which is the dynamical variable in relativity 
and cosmology. Time emerges in relativity as 
parameter which describes the change of the 
3-space. The common feature of both classical 
description of dynamics of a single particle as 
well as the evolution of 3-space is that both of 
them have a “point” of the beginning (described 
as a conical singularity). In the case of space-
time it means that the 3-space has a zero radius, 
for example a zero radius of the universe beyond 
which all concepts such as space and time loose 
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their sense. From this point of view one could 
argue that this is exactly the point at which space 
and time came into existence, that is, they are 
“created” at this point. The problem, however, 
typical for both classical dynamics, as well as for 
cosmology, is that there is a dichotomy between 
the laws of dynamics and initial conditions; there 
is a variety of solutions corresponding to the 
dynamical equations which drive the evolution 
and which contain a conical singularity. The 
theory can not select a particular solution, which 
would be unique and correspond to the visible 
universe.
We thus face a problem of how to remove 
this initial point from the solutions. In classical 
mechanics, it is impossible to do it at all, for time 
and space do pre-exist and form a background for 
development of a system. The initial condition 
corresponds to a choice, made by observers when 
they start to follow the evolution of a particle. In 
the case of relativity the situation is much more 
exciting, for the beginning of time corresponds 
to some particular properties of space, when the 
radius of the universe is zero, for example. This 
point forms a problem for classical physics, for all 
physical observables approach infinite values in 
the vicinity of this point; classical physics looses 
its applicability at the singularity. At the same 
time, as was proved by Hawking and Penrose, 
the singularity in classical general relativity is 
inevitable. The presence of the initial singularities 
in general relativity leads to the impossibility of 
formulating in physical terms the initial conditions 
of the visible universe. The dichotomy between 
the initial conditions and the laws of the evolution 
of the universe becomes unbridgeable. If this is 
true, and we cannot specify in physical terms the 
“laws” of the initial conditions of the universe, we 
could not fully answer the question on the nature 
of the visible universe. In this case the temptation 
of a deistic kind comes to a cosmologist’s mind; 
one appeals to a deity which did set up the initial 
conditions and the laws of the universe, but then 
left the universe to its own devices. Physics and 
cosmology provide us with the understanding 
of the laws of the evolution of the universe, but 
they do not teach us about the foundations of 
their facticity, that is, in a theological language, 
what was God’s choice in setting up the initial 
conditions.
From a theological point of view, which 
advocates that the created order is contingent 
upon God, that is, radically different from God, 
and the laws of the world are free from any 
inherent necessity, originating in God, it would 
be ambitious to pretend to uncover the “laws” 
which stand behind the initial conditions of the 
universe, for the knowledge of these “laws”, 
that is, knowing that the initial conditions of the 
visible universe are conditioned by something 
which is ontologically necessary, we would enter 
the domain of the Divine reason and attempt 
to apprehend God’s intentions in creating the 
world. This is, however, hardly to be achieved 
in cosmology on its own, so that theology enters 
the scene of speculation at this point under the 
disguise of a hidden theological commitment in 
cosmology. 
Indeed, some cosmologists argue for the 
possible comprehension of the “laws” of boundary 
(initial) conditions of the visible universe in 
principle. Hawking, for example, appeals to the 
history of science to argue that science eventually 
uncovers the underlying order of things and events 
which seemed to be decoherent and arbitrary 
before. He believes that the same kind of order 
can be found in the extreme physical situation 
at the cosmological singularity: “there ought to 
be some principle that picks out one initial state 
and hence one model, to represent our universe” 
(Hawking 1988, pp. 123,133). This belief seems 
to go contrary to the result on inevitability of the 
singularities in cosmologies with all pathological 
features of the theory, which we mentioned above 
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(infinities of all classical physical variables). 
This in turn provides us with an argument that 
the “law” of the initial conditions must be non-
classical, different and new in comparison with 
what is known from general relativity. These 
laws, if they exist, should avoid the problem of 
temporal beginning, which has its root in the 
asymmetry between space and time. Indeed 
the conical space-time of the universe has one 
particular feature, which makes the whole 
geometry singular: its boundary is formed by a 
conical surface plus a singular point, that is, the 
apex of a cone. The new nonclassical “laws” of the 
singularity, if they exist, must change our view 
on space-time of the universe as a singular cone. 
This means that the geometrical presentation of 
the evolution of the visible universe as containing 
a singular point corresponding to its alleged 
beginning must be replaced by something 
which has a different, non-singular boundary. In 
this case the problem of the beginning of time, 
according to the proponents of the “laws” of the 
initial conditions will be explained away and no 
explicit theistic references would be necessary 
to explain the “temporal origin” of the universe. 
How successful is this program?
Elimination of Real Time  
in Quantum Cosmology ?
When Hawking advocates the existence 
of the laws of the initial conditions, he assumes 
that cosmology from being a classical view of 
the universe must be transformed into the so 
called quantum cosmology. The latter “theory” 
represents an as yet unfinished synthesis of 
general relativity and quantum mechanics, 
applied to the universe as a whole. This synthesis 
is a big issue in modern physics, and needs be 
subjected to a long philosophical scrutiny. The 
challenge of quantum cosmology is to provide 
the “laws” of the initial conditions of the 
visible universe, that is, to describe the state of 
origination of the universe in such terms as to 
condition the emergence of the empirical flowing 
time in the universe. This means that in no way 
must time be an a-priori ingredient of these 
“laws”. At the same time, quantum cosmology 
does not deny the presence of space in these laws. 
In other words, space is considered as a more 
fundamental ontological reference than time. The 
visible universe is in space and in time; the state 
which is prior to the visible universe can not be in 
time, but it is accepted that it can be in space. The 
existence of space which is devoid of temporality 
is considered as existence forever, with no need 
for an explanation “when” this space came into 
existence at all. The timeless state of the universe 
(as a pure space) can be considered as an initial 
member in a series of temporal causation, which 
itself is beyond time.
The conceptual transition from classical to 
quantum physics can be understood as a change 
of description of physical objects as having some 
given positions in space to the description of the 
dynamics of objects in terms of the so called wave 
function, which is a function of spatial coordinates 
and is subject to evolution in time according to 
the Schrödinger equation. It is important that the 
coordinates of the particle can not be observed
precisely, as occurs in classical mechanics, 
but one talks about the probability of the particle 
to be found in the vicinity of the point, which is 
described by the square of the modulus of the 
wave function. In general this probability is a 
function of time and its evolution is completely 
determined by the Schrodinger equation, if one 
knows the distribution of probabilities at some 
initial moment of time. The evolution, described 
by the Schrödinger equation is reversible, i.e. 
knowing the initial state one can predict all other 
states in the evolution of a particle, and, vice 
versa, one can restore the initial condition if the 
state of particle is known afterwards. In this sense 
the “evolution” is a-historical, that is, no novelty 
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is generated in the system. The specificity of 
the system is thus determined by the setting of 
particular initial conditions. However, the most 
considerable conceptual change when one turns 
to quantum physics, is that the description of 
physical processes is done in terms of the wave 
function which is not a physical observable in 
principle. As a mathematical object it belongs 
to the abstract Hilbert space, whose ontology is 
detached from the empirical world, and represents 
rather the world of intelligible forms.
The synthesis of quantum physics with 
general relativity, especially in its application to 
cosmology, leads to a novel feature of the resulting 
theory, which did not exist in the quantum physics 
of microobjects. This feature is related to nature 
of time. As we mentioned in the previous section 
time in relativity is not a natural parameter in the 
theory, it is rather an epiphenomenon, constructed 
upon the primary dynamical variable, which 
is 3-dimensional space. This means that if one 
wants to construct a quantum state of the whole 
universe, i.e. describe this mathematically by the 
wave function of the universe, this function will 
not be a function of time explicitly, it will be the 
function of 3-geometry and matter (some field for 
example) which is linked to geometry according to 
general relativity. The state of the universe is thus 
described by the wave function which is defined 
in the superspace of all possible 3-dimensional 
geometries as well as all possible states of matter. 
Time is not present in this “frozen” formalism. 
To elucidate this latter point one can make 
a contrast with the wave function in the realm 
of ordinary empirical time where the function 
follows Shrodinger equation with time. If the 
universe would be described by the wave function 
following the equation like this, its evolution 
would follow a simple, reversible dynamics. 
This means that we can predict the state of the 
universe at some moment of time t2, knowing its 
state at t1 < t2. Since the evolution is reversible, 
one can reverse this conclusion and predict the 
past state of the universe at t1 if one knows it at 
t2 which can be taken as the present. Quantum 
cosmology of the early state of the universe, 
however has to deal with the situation where the 
temporality of the universe disappears, so that the 
description of the equation for the wave function 
of the universe cannot be done in terms of any 
temporal dynamics. Since we want to construct 
the wave function which corresponds to the 
initial state in terms of classical time t, there must 
be such a solution the sought wave function with 
no time must be somehow matched with the wave 
function which describes the classical universe 
with time. The condition of this matching would 
be by definition the “origination” of the visible 
universe. 
A possible solution for the wave function 
which would provide a conical singularity, and 
where the initial point would correspond to the 
beginning of space and time together, is not a 
good candidate for it represents a space-time 
with a boundary, which is the surface of the cone 
plus the point of origination. This is why the 
desirable solution for 4-dimensional geometry 
in the quantum domain should rather correspond 
to the geometry where the 4-dimensional space-
time has only a single 3-dimensional boundary. 
At first glance this kind of solution does not 
relieve us from the presence of time, for the 
boundary of 4-dimensional space contains a 
temporal dimension. The crucial step which has 
been taken in order to overcome this concern is 
a conceptual change in views on the asymmetry 
between space and time, which is an attribute 
of experience in the macroscopic realm where 
time is usually considered as an extra-dimension 
of 4-dimensional space. To overcome this 
asymmetry Hawking suggested that time, as 
we perceive it and as it appears in cosmological 
equations, to be converted into a rather a 
mathematical abstraction of time – imaginary 
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time, which is similar to space, but which is 
principally unobservable and non-measurable. 
The trick is simple technically but, however, is 
not so convincing philosophically.10 
One may elucidate further how the 
geometrization of time, that is, its actual removal 
happens in Hawking’s model. The transition 
to imaginary time is dictated in quantum 
cosmology by two reasons: 1) it attempts to 
provide the description of the initial conditions 
of the universe with no reference to anything 
beyond the universe, which could condition the 
initial conditions from outside; thus it is believed 
that the initial conditions of the universe could 
be inferred as a part of a theory; 2) in calculating 
the main object of quantum description of the 
universe, that is, the abstract wave function, 
which is to provide a solution the geometrical 
configuration of the universe, the method, 
used by Hawking, involved the so called path-
integral, the mathematical object, defined on 
the set of all possible universes (all imaginable 
3-dimensional spaces). This mathematical 
method, however, imposed a serious constraint 
on the form of those metrics, that is, spaces, 
whose paths should appear in the integral. As 
Hawking writes, “It seems, therefore, that the 
path integral for quantum gravity must be taken 
over nonsingular Euclidean metrics” (Hawking, 
Penrose 1996, p. 66), that is, over the metrics 
with imaginary time. One should remember 
this statement for our further analysis, for it 
illustrates a remarkable inference in theoretical 
cosmology: the purely mathematical requirement 
for consistency and the non-singular nature 
of calculations leads to a choice of the set of 
geometries with no obvious reference to the 
physical world. As Hawking expressed this in 
his Brief History of Time “to avoid the technical 
difficulties with Feynman's sum over histories, 
one must use imaginary time” (Hawking 1988, 
p. 134).
The crucial point now is to formulate 
proper initial conditions for the space-time of 
the universe, assuming that the universe in not 
pseudo-euclidean, that is presented by making 
explicit the difference between space and time, 
but Euclidean, that is, time and space are equal 
and “there is no difference between the time 
direction and directions of space” (Ibid.) There are 
two ‘natural’ (mathematical) choices: the infinite 
Euclidean space (which incorporates time), 
and the compact, finite in volume, space which 
does not have a boundary. Hawking provides 
some reasons in favor of the finite (compact) 
space which does not contain a boundary, This 
constitutes the essence of his and Hartle “The 
No-Boundary Proposal”, that the path integral, 
involved in calculation of the wave function of 
the universe must be taken over all compact 
Euclidean metrics (Hartle, Hawking, 1983). This 
removes the problem of the initial conditions in 
the universe because, logically, the condition 
which is supposed to condition the initial state 
of the universe now reduces to a tautological 
statement that the universe must be initially with 
no boundary, that is, the term ‘initial’ looses its 
ordinary sense, for there is no special location in 
the universe which could be taken as an ‘initial’ 
boundary: there is no boundary. The immediate 
implication of such a conclusion is that the 
classical solutions of the cosmological models 
with non-physical infinities in the singularities do 
not threaten physics anymore, so that one could 
be tempted to say, that the collapse of physics at 
the cosmological singularity is overcome; there 
is no breakdown of physics at the edge of the 
universe and hence there is no need to appeal 
to the ‘laws of the boundary conditions’which, 
according to classical metaphysics could manifest 
the transcendent plan of the divine design. One 
should remember, however, that, according to 
Hawking himself, the “no-boundary proposal” is 
merely a proposal, it is not a principle, which is 
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deduced from any more fundamental theory. In a 
way it is the ultimate premise, which can not be 
demonstrated syllogistically. As Hawking affirms 
“like any other scientific theory, it may initially be 
put forward for aesthetic or metaphysical reasons” 
(Hawking 1988, p. 136). This merely reaffirms 
that the no-boundary proposal is a metaphysical, 
that is non-physical proposal, which is dictated 
by some indemonstrable belief in reality as “self-
contained and not affected by anything outside 
itself” (Ibid.) 
Finally one can say that if the no-boundary 
proposal is implemented in theoretical 
calculations, it leads to a wave function of 
the universe as a function of the radius of a 
3-dimensional section of the 4-dimensional 
compact space which incorporates an imaginary 
time. The radius a satisfies the Einstein equation 
which involves the distribution of matter in the 
universe. The radius of a 3-dimensional compact 
space a can extend indefinitely from zero to 
infinity. There is however a threshold in terms of 
a which marks a radical change in the behavior 
of the wave-function of the universe. This 
change corresponds to the transition from the 
quantum state of the universe as a 4-dimensional 
compact Euclidean space (with imaginary 
time being a spatial dimension) to the classical 
evolving universe, whose geometrical structure 
corresponds in general to the curvilinear cylinder 
where its vertical dimension corresponds to real, 
empirical time. The change from the quantum 
state of the universe to the ‘classical’ universe, 
whose evolution leads ultimately to what we 
observe as the present-day visible universe, is 
accompanied by the transition from imaginary 
time to real time. 11 Hawking proposes to present 
this transition graphically in the form given 
below: 
This transition is supposed to describe the 
‘creation’ of the visible universe. There is no 
however, any temporal location, or origination 
of the universe, for it originates from space, 
which has no temporal properties, space simply 
exists. One must be articulated once more that 
the creation of the visible universe in Hawking’s 
model is not creation as ‘origination’, it is rather 
a transition (in a sense which we will have to 
establish) from a-temporal, that is, timeless 
Euclidean space, to space-time, where time is 
distinct from space, and where one observes the 
temporal flux of events.
Fig. 2 Hawking's model: “creation” of the universe with the flow of time from the space-like eternity
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The major achievement of the scenario, 
proposed by Hawking is the elimination of the 
singular states in the history of the universe, 
where the physical laws break down. The absence 
of temporal dimension in the boundary state of 
the universe removes the problem of preexistent 
time and offers a response to the paradoxes 
connected with the creation in pre-existent time. 
One should remember, however, that the validity 
of this response is contingent upon the belief that 
that the world has an imaginary dimension, that 
is, the very notion of the world is imbued with the 
fundamentally non-physical.
Hawking suggests that if “the so-called 
imaginary time is really the real time of the 
world, and that what we call real time is just a 
figment of our imaginations” (Hawking 1988, 
p. 139), then the entire universe is compact, with 
no boundary, so that the vision of the universe 
as having a beginning in the past (as well as the 
problem of original creation in general) is just 
an illusion of human consciousness. Hawking’s 
attempt to elucidate the meaning of the word 
“reality”, as he uses it, leads him ultimately to 
confusion, for, according to him, mathematical 
theory is just a model and there is no meaning 
in questions about the ‘reality’ of time, whether 
it is imaginary or real: “it is simply a matter of 
which is the more useful description” (Hawking 
1988, p. 139). There is, however, a positive asset 
of quantum cosmology, namely the prediction of 
the inflationary behavior of the universe, when it 
gets off the quantum realm; for the inflationary 
cosmology is a popular model nowadays, which is 
capable of solving of some puzzles of the classical 
Big-Bang cosmology. 12
The model, proposed by Hawking, caused a 
resonance not only in professional physical and 
mathematical circles, but also among philosophers 
and even theologians. The reason for this is that 
Hawking himself concluded his exposition of the 
“history of time” in the universe in a theological 
manner; he states that “the idea that space and 
time may form a closed surface without boundary 
also has profound implications for the role of God 
in the affairs of the universe” (Hawking 1988, 
p. 140). Immediately after this “theological” 
claim he exposed himself as a deist, by asserting 
that one needs the idea of God in order to describe 
the initial conditions in the universe and to set up 
the laws of the universe (Hawking 1988, p. 140). 
Finally, in order to refute his own deism, Hawking 
proposed to take his scenario of the “evolution” 
of the universe with an imaginary time, not 
only as a model (which helps with explanation 
of observations in a spirit of his positivism), 
but also ontologically: “if the universe is really 
completely self-contained, having no boundary 
or edge, it would have neither beginning, nor end: 
it would simply be” (Hawking 1988, p. 141). The 
ultimate manifestation of Hawking’s triumph as 
a “religious thinker” is in his concluding phrase 
which caused so much agitation and controversies 
in scientifico-theological circles, namely “What 
place, then, for a creator? (Hawking 1988, 
p. 141).
Some General Comments  
on Hawking's Model
Hawking builds his cosmology on the 
grounds of positivistic, (according to his own 
definition) methodology, i.e. in an approach 
which never makes enquiries on the ontological 
meaning of those “realities” which are present 
in cosmological theories. He describes his 
understanding of the meaning of cosmological 
theories in the following words: “Theory is just 
a model of the universe, or a restricted part of 
it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the 
model to observations we make. It exists only in 
our minds and has no other reality (whatever that 
might mean)” (Hawking 1988, p. 9; also p. 139). 
If one reads this passage straightforwardly 
one will be puzzled by the emphasized part of 
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this quotation; for it follows that cosmology, 
being a theoretical enterprise, does not provide 
us with any realistic vision of what the universe 
is actually, but supplies only the symbolic means 
for the description of what we observe here and 
now. If cosmology exists only in our minds, it 
is similar to any kind of science fiction with the 
only difference that it pretends to describe the 
entire universe in a coherent mathematical way, 
which will be consistent with what we observe in 
the sky. If one follows consistently this view one 
must admit that such notions as the universe as a 
whole, Big Bang etc. are just mental constructs 
and they have no independent ontological status 
apart from their remote effects in the present day 
universe (this conclusion does not surprise us at 
all, for we have already established the limited 
sense of reality behind cosmological constructs). 
Summarizing in different words, cosmology as 
a theory dealing with the remote temporal past 
as well as with remote parts of its space has no 
ontological references, according to Hawking. 
But Hawking achieved this conclusion on the 
basis of the ad hoc positivism and not through 
the epistemological analysis of cosmological 
constructs. All its claims have a status of 
conventions useful for understanding of the 
observable universe in terms of unobservable 
entities, that is, equations and concepts. Here he 
manifests the intrinsic teleology pertaining to 
the process of cosmological explanation, which 
demands the appeal to the entities which allow 
a coherent synthesis of the visible universe. A 
particular cosmological theory is valued for its 
quality to provide a more effective description 
of our observations; there is no sense in asking 
whether the constructs which constitute the theory 
are referred to anything which we call “real”, 
they just matter as useful tools of description and 
no more. The ultimate description of the universe 
represents a purpose of cosmological research, 
but this regulative, formal purposiveness of 
cosmology does not have to entail the existence 
of the material pole (nexus finalis) of this purpose. 
The universe as a whole, be it classical or quantum 
cosmology, is not an object, for the efficient 
physical causality is not applicable to it. It is 
subject to that causality which relates the notion 
of the universe, as a purpose of explanation, to 
the faculty of reflective judgement, using Kantian 
terminology. 
Later Hawking reaffirmed his positivistic 
approach to cosmology by juxtaposing it with 
the Platonism of Penrose (Hawking, Penrose 
1996, p. 121). According to Hawking, Penrose is 
worried about the reality of those concepts which 
are involved in quantum cosmology, whereas 
it does not bother him: “I do not demand that a 
theory corresponds to reality because I do not 
know what it is (Ibid.). This last remark makes 
the overall philosophical position of Hawking 
controversial because, as we mentioned before, he 
is prone to ontologically realistic commitments.
Indeed if cosmological theory does not 
provide any empirical evidence for ontological 
references of cosmological constructs (such as 
cosmological fluid, global space-time, the wave 
function of the universe, the Big Bang etc.), then 
any positive or negative predication about God as 
the absolute cause of the temporal beginning of the 
universe, as inferred from a cosmological theory, 
has only a rhetorical sense; for the construct of 
the early universe which Hawking proposes as a 
“true” theory of the state of the universe which 
preceded that one which we observe now, is 
just a construct, not an ontological entity. This 
implies that if Hawking wants to use the beauty 
and elegance of this construct in order to deny the 
existence of God-creator, that is, the original cause 
of the universe, he tacitly levels both constructs, 
“the universe” and “God”, making them uniform 
terms of the logical alternative which, according 
to Hawking’s logic , must exist only in his mind. 
If this is true, one then immediately recognizes 
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that the “God” which is meant by Hawking in his 
famous phrase “What place, then, for a creator?” 
is just a concept, an idea of God, a mental symbol 
of an uncertain deity. If Hawking thinks about 
God (as a genuine positivist) as a construct, then 
he can dismiss one construct (God) in favor of 
another (timeless universe). But this operation of 
the reason has no proper theological implications, 
for the God of theology is not a construct, but 
a subject of existential, that is ontological, 
experience. All idols of God (even those negative 
which follow from cosmology) are strictly refused 
by apophatic theology.
But if Hawking believes that he can 
dismiss God in an ontological sense, then one 
should admit, that he falls into contradiction 
with himself, for there is no chance of 
comprehending the existence of the living God 
while resting on a positivistic view of nature. 
In the concluding chapter of his book Hawking 
exposes his controversial thought by making 
a correct distinction between two questions in 
cosmology: a) “What is the universe?” and b) 
“Why the universe does exist?”. He assumes that 
his response to the question a) is provided by 
his arguments throughout his book, that is, the 
universe has such a particular structure, which 
follows from the laws of physics and a special 
no-boundary condition (we remember that this 
is a positivist’s statement). But in the question b) 
Hawking enquires not into the particular temporal 
origin of the universe, but into the fact of the very 
existence of the universe. Why does the universe, 
which is described by the Hawking model, exist 
at all? What is the ground of contingent facticity 
of the universe. This question, by it essence is 
a perennial ontological question, a response to 
which can never be made on positivistic grounds. 
One can say that with certainty, although negative, 
that this question cannot be answered. Hawking’s 
hope is associated with his vision of a complete 
theory of the world, which “would be the ultimate 
triumph of human reason-for then we would 
know the mind of God” (Hawking 1988, p. 175). 
It is still unclear whether the knowledge of “the 
mind of God” in the last quotation is just a mental 
construction of a positivist scientist, or Hawking 
speaking about knowledge of God through 
ontological communion with Him. The dream of 
the final theory as a principle which could explain 
the structure of the universe in self-sufficient 
terms, without appeal to its contingency upon a 
transcendent source, assumes that the advance 
of science will stop at some stage, so that the 
ultimate knowledge will give a divine power into 
the hands of human beings. This could make a 
real challenge to the creatio ex nihilo concept for 
knowing the laws of the universe in full would 
imply no necessity for a transcendent creator. 
This implies that Hawking’s claims of dismissal 
of a creator of the universe in a sense of an original 
creation, have a much more moderate impact on 
theology in comparison with his beliefs in the 
final theory, be it purely positivistic or not. 13
In spite of the preceding criticism of 
Hawking’s philosophical presuppositions, the 
goal here is to demonstrate that his model of 
creation of the universe out of nothing, which 
by no means dismisses the Christian dogma of 
creatio ex nihilo, can actually contribute in a quite 
sophisticated way to the Christian understanding 
of creation out of nothing. This assumes that one 
must undertake a theological interpretation of 
Hawking’s model, thus intentionally departing 
from a positivistic treatment of cosmology. 
However in this interpretation we follow not a 
straightforward invocation of theological parallels, 
but careful studying of Hawking’s propositions 
philosophically, in particular through a prism of 
the Kantian antinomies.
Our task now is to make an analysis of the 
key concepts employed by Hawking, in order to 
make a distinction among them in terms of their 
ontological nature: what is empirical in his model 
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and what is intelligible, what is the meaning of 
the mixing of the empirical and intelligible which 
takes place in his model and how this interplay 
between empirical and intelligible can be used in 
explication of that which theological creatio ex 
nihilo proclaims. By so doing, we intentionally 
interpret the theory through those philosophical 
and theological ideas which are not present in the 
theory itself. The meaning of such an analysis 
is to support an intuition that any scientific 
theory, attempting to argue on the origins of the 
world (including Hawking’s as an example), will 
inevitably contain the features of the dualism 
between the empirical and intelligible. The 
problem then is not to overcome this dualism, but 
to identify this dualism as an inevitable structural 
element of all attempts to treat the universe as 
creation, the structural element which involves the 
process of knowing the universe into antinomial 
difficulty manifesting the inaccessibility of 
creation on the grounds of rational enquiry. 
By revealing the apophatic nature of all claims 
on creation out of nothing in cosmology, the 
knowledge of contingent facticity of the universe 
remains an ultimate mystery pointing toward its 
otherness, the otherness which points beyond 
creation as such. 
Imaginary Time in Quantum Cosmology  
and Neo-Platonic Timeless Time 
The model of Hawking is a model of the 
created order (but radically different from that 
one which is associated with the empirical 
temporal order) which can be used for formalizing 
the logic of all possible attempts to describe 
creation from within the world. In words of the 
Greek philosophy, with the help of this model 
one can formulate the logos of creation (the 
expression theological in its essence), where the 
logos stands for the underlying principle, the 
foundation to which we have access from within 
the world. As we mentioned this before, this logos 
is encoded in the dichotomy in creation between 
the intelligible and empirical. This dichotomy 
has a particular technical expression through the 
Greek noun diaphora (difference) in creation, as 
its constitutive element. In ancient Greek thought 
this diaphora can be elucidated in terms of 
temporality. 
Indeed, recall the distinction between 
phenomenal reality and transcendent reality, 
which was developed in neo-Platonism and 
was used by Christian theologians in order to 
contrast the created and Creator. At the same time 
Christianity through adapting and interpreting 
neo-Platonism made a distinction between 
the intelligible in creation as contrasted to the 
empirical (phenomenal) in creation. This implied 
that the term “transcendent” in the Christian 
context was referred to the uncreated, whereas 
both the intelligible and empirical were treated as 
immanent with and constitutive for creation.
Neo-Platonists made a distinction between 
time and eternity, which was based on the 
distinction in relationship between eternity and 
intelligible universe on the one hand, and between 
time and visible (empirical) universe on the other 
hand. In the Christian context it can be affirmed 
that the realm of the intelligible has no time (in 
an empirical sense), i.e. it is timeless, not eternal; 
for it is still created, so that it has a beginning 
in a logical sense and cannot be called eternal in 
the same sense as one asserts the eternity of God. 
The empirical realm, i.e. the world of senses is 
always in a state of temporal flux of events and 
the creation of novelty; from this perspective one 
can use the Neo-Platonic terminology in order 
to speak about timeless time of the intelligible 
created domain as transcendent time. In this 
context the adjective transcendent stands as a 
contrast to empirical time, which is measured by 
the flow of events.
What then is the meaning of timeless time 
(or transcendent time) at all if it is detached from 
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empirical, living time? The response to this 
question can come from the observation that since 
all sensible things, involved in temporal flux, 
are “mirrored” in the intelligible realm through 
the immanent aspects of their inner essences 
(i.e. the logoi), the flux of these things itself 
can be “mirrored” in the intelligible world as a 
definite structure (e.g. logical structure), so that 
this structure would represent itself as “frozen 
time”, as time with no succession or happenings 
of events, as a serial order stripped of process. 
This “frozen time” is called timeless time or 
transcendent time.
There is an interesting distinction, made 
by Proclus, between transcendent time as 
“unparticipated” time on the one hand, and 
empirical time as “participated” time (see for 
details (Plass 1966). The transcendent time is a 
fixed ‘monad’ in distinction with empirical time; 
it can be thought as a number (in a Pythagorean 
sense), the number of cycles of the Hellenistic 
universe. The temporal flux of the empirical 
world proceeds according to this number, i.e. 
‘temporal time’ is derivative from transcendent 
time. The ontological status of transcendent time 
is determined as its participation in the ousia of 
an intelligible being, which is timeless. Proclus 
used such adjectives as “eternal, fixed, unified” 
when he referred to transcendent time. If one 
appropriates transcendent time as a feature of 
the created realm, it would be more suitable to 
use such adjectives as “timeless” or “immutable” 
with respect to it.
Proclus thought about time as an integral 
concept, which unites both aspects of one and 
the same being. He treated time as a two-sided 
unity: on the one side time is in itself, i.e. there is 
time’s inner being which is stable, immutable and 
timeless; on the other side, outwardly, i.e. with 
respect to the empirical world, time reveals itself 
as temporal flow of events and things. The former 
aspect of time is unparticipated time, the latter 
one is the time which participates in transcendent 
time.
Coming back to quantum cosmology, it is 
not difficult to catch some similarities between 
Hawking’s model of the universe and that one in 
neo-Platonism. Indeed the attempt of Hawking to 
make a distinction between the reality of imaginary 
time of the quantum universe and the reality of 
empirical flowing time, which one experiences 
in macroscopic visible universe, is based on his 
assumption about human cognitive faculties. He 
asserts that what one experiences as real time 
is just an “figment of our imagination.” This is 
similar to the neoplatonic distinction between 
two sides of the same time as unparticipated and 
participated time. Indeed, the imaginary time in 
quantum universe is undivided and unified time, 
which is, in fact, just a spatial dimension, given 
in its whole span across the Euclidean universe 
and is described by some number, a radius of this 
universe, for example. This is the inner aspect 
of time, that is, it is transcendent timeless time 
(timeless in a sense that the order of things in this 
time is not identifiable as the flow of events in 
real time). The outward aspect of this time, which 
is accessible to human perception, corresponds 
to temporal flow in pseudo-Euclidean space-
time. It is because of a human intellectual ability 
that one can speculate that the empirical time 
can be thought as imagination of transcendent 
time; thus one can assert that the empirical time 
indeed participates in transcendent time (but 
we know about this only through an intellectual 
inference).
In analogy with Pythagorean metaphysical 
mathematics one can argue that the wave function 
of the universe, which contains implicitly all 
information about the entire structure of the 
universe as a spatial and temporal continuum, 
can be considered as a “monadic” property of the 
universe, that is, such an intelligible totality which 
is conditioned only by the laws of mathematics 
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and by the metaphysical (that is, non-empirical) 
no-boundary proposal. The visible universe, 
as a domain in the empirical part of the created 
realm, is predetermined somehow by the wave 
function in the quantum domain. In other words 
the “monadic” wave function of the universe, as 
a part of the intelligible, contains, according to 
quantum cosmology, the ground for a particular 
realization of the visible universe. We do not 
want to pursue this idea in order to claim that the 
ontology of the visible universe is rooted in the 
ontology of the intelligible transcendent time. 
This would be the desire of Hawking, and it was 
exactly the issue where he was criticized. Our 
interpretation follows rather a dualistic approach, 
based on the basic dichotomy within the created 
world, the the diaphora between sensible and 
intelligible creation with no desire to ontologize 
the imaginary time universe as existent on the 
same footing with the empirical universe. On the 
contrary, the comparison of quantum cosmology 
with the neo-Platonic treatment of time convinces 
us that the quantum Euclidean universe in 
Hawking’s model is an intellectual construction, 
that is, its ontological status corresponds to an 
entity from the intelligible realm of the created 
world. This makes Hawking’s rhetoric on the 
place of a creator in the universe unsound. 
Indeed the 4-dimensional space of the Euclidean 
universe, being by its epistemological status an 
unobservable entity, can only be hypostasized 
by the reason as intelligible reality. The straight 
relation of this intelligible reality to the visible 
universe, which is made along the lines of the 
positivistic rhethoric of Hawking, is inconsistent.
One more note on the similarities between 
Hawking’s model and neo-Platonic views on 
time. There is the distinction between so called 
first and second creation which can be found in 
neo-Platonism. The first creation is the creation 
of eternity itself, whereas the second creation 
is the creation of time. In Hawking’s case it is 
difficult to talk seriously about his quantum, 
Euclidean universe as eternal and endless time, of 
the ‘greatest time’, for in terms of imaginary time 
the universe is finite. It is certain, however, that 
an order in imaginary time is the timeless order 
from the point of view of real time. In this sense 
it recalls the difference between eternity and “the 
whole time” in neo-Platonism.
The wave function of the universe can be 
said to encapsulate the whole time, rather than 
eternity. Indeed, the wave function satisfies the 
equation which does not contain time at all; time 
appears later as an internal parameter, derivative 
from some particular spatial degrees of freedom. 
But since by itself the wave function represents 
conceptual reality, that is, it is an object from 
an intelligible creation, one cannot say that it 
describes in any plausible way eternity.
In analogy with neo-Platonists who assert 
that the whole time is unity, which is fixed 
numerically (in a Pythogorean sense), and that 
the flowing time is derivative from the “whole 
time”, that is, its activity (energia) is caused by 
the whole time, one can see in Hawking’s model 
a similar tendency of thought, namely that the 
genuine ontological time is imaginary time, 
and the wholeness of this time for us, human 
creatures whose senses adjusted rather to the 
pseudo-euclidean temporal flow, is manifested 
either in the abstract idea of the wave function of 
the universe (which, in fact, contains as a variable 
the variety of different geometries containing 
in a codified form the wholeness of their own 
times), or in the image of the 4-dimensional 
Euclidean sphere. The energeia of this timeless 
transcendent time (imaginary time), that is, the 
“transformation” of the “whole time” into the 
temporal flow in real time corresponds to the 
transition from intelligible timeless time to the 
empirical time accessible to our senses14
The major question then is: what is the 
status of the transition from imaginary time to 
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real time? Either this transition is physically 
real, that is, the timeless Euclidean universe is 
ontologized as physical reality (which seems to be 
Hawking’s claim when he argues as a physicist), 
or this transition is purely subjective, that is, it 
plays merely a role of a theoretical hypothesis in 
justifying some observable data with no serious 
reference to the concept of reality which stands 
behind the scientific constructs involved (this is 
again Hawking’s claim when he reveals himself 
as a positivist).
With no further comments on this internal 
inconsistency of the quantum cosmology of 
Hawking, we are inclined to interpret the 
transition from the intelligible Euclidean 
universe to the visible universe which is implied 
in this cosmology, not as “physically objective”, 
and not as “psychologically subjective”, but 
rather as a detection of the structural ontological 
differentiation between the intelligible and 
sensible realms of being. The difference of this 
interpretation from the original Hawking’s model 
as well as from its critiques by other writers, 
is that the model of the intelligible Euclidean 
universe with imaginary timeless time (let us 
denote this universe as IU-intelligible universe) 
and the visible universe with real, empirical time 
(denote VU-visible universe) are both treated as 
two ontologically different realms of the created 
order. The transition IU → VU which stands 
in quantum cosmology for the explanation of 
the origination of the visible universe from the 
quantum domain and which corresponds to the 
diagram in Fig. 2 receives a completely different 
interpretation as seen from within Christianized 
Platonism, where both realms are related to the 
created order, but not to anything beyond the 
created being.
The reader should remember that Fig. 2 
is a typical picture reproduced in many books 
on quantum cosmology and its philosophical 
commentaries, which explains in visual terms 
what the model, based on the no-boundary 
proposal attempts to say – namely, that the visible 
universe (VU), associated with pseudo-euclidean 
structure (that is with clear distinction between 
time and space), does originate from the timeless 
Euclidean region (IU), where time is spatialized, 
being an imaginary spatial coordinate.15 The 
Euclidean universe, not being in time, possesses 
existence with no point of origin: it just exists. 
The visible universe has its origin as the transition 
from the quantum domain to the classical 
domain. Both universes IU and VU are assumed 
to be on the same ontological footing in quantum 
cosmology, so that the diagram is supposed to 
present the process in the physical realm.
According to our interpretation the diagram 
in Fig. 2, however, corresponds rather to the 
transition between two ontologically distinct 
domains, so that their linking together in one 
single complex, as is done in the diagram, has no 
more than an allegorical sense for it unites two 
ontologically different entities. The transition 
IU → VU then has meaning not as a causal 
transition from one physical stage to another, 
but as a logical indication of the difference in the 
created domain between what is given to us as 
the visible universe, and what is thought of as the 
intelligible explanation of what is visible.
The comparison of Hawking’s model 
which affirms the universe as a closed one with 
imaginary time on the one hand, and which 
provides the mechanism of the emergence of 
the visible universe involved in temporal flux 
on the other hand, with the neo-Platonic model 
of time as a dialectics of transcendent timeless 
time and flowing time, has for the purposes of 
our analysis the following significance. The neo-
Platonic dichotomy between transcendent and 
empirical time is rearticulated in the Christian 
context as the polarity between the intelligible 
and sensible realms of creation. In other words, 
from perspective (of the dualism between 
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the sensible and intelligible in creation) the 
ambition of quantum cosmology to describe, by 
using Hawking’s model, the creatio ex nihilo is 
unjustified because, in fact, it describes rather 
the “origination” of that part of space-time, 
which we associate with the visible universe, out 
of the timeless realm, which by its own genetic 
status represents rather an intelligible world, than 
anything physical, if one intends to ontologize it. 
If we refine this thought further, we must admit 
that Hawking’s model proposes a scenario of 
some ‘changes’ in the created contingent universe 
(be it intelligible or empirical universe), through 
the mathematical and physical laws. The fact 
of this contingency is not reflected in quantum 
cosmology, which, by its methodological design is 
monistic, that is, it tries to explain the structure of 
the universe from within itself. The contingency, 
on the contrary, if someone would like to reveal 
its presence in the cosmological theory, would 
mean identifying such elements in the model, 
which point to the ground of the universe, its 
immanent physical and mathematical laws, that 
is, their contingent facticity, which is beyond 
the description in terms of these laws, that is 
transcendent to the universe.
Thus our next step in the analysis of 
Hawking’s cosmological model is to understand 
what it actually says in terms of the universe’s 
contingence and this leads us again to the question 
as to what is the meaning of the distinction which 
appears in Hawking’s universe between the 
spatialised, imaginary time-universe, where time 
is effectively closed and finite, and the pseudo-
euclidean space-time of the visible universe, 
where the linear history of events is contemplated 
by us. One possible answer comes from the 
distinction between the Greek vision of the closed 
universe, where there was no actual flow of time 
and special dates in history. History was always 
problematic for Greek cosmology; history was 
thought rather as an illusion in an endless cyclic 
return of the world. The Hellenistic universe has 
no beginning and no end terms. It is clear now that 
the model of Hawking, if one treats this model 
ontologically and accepts that his imaginary time 
is real (so that the universe is closed) rather stands 
for the ideal of Greek cosmology and provides 
the “schemata” of history as the sequence of 
possible events stripped of the temporal flow. The 
Hellenistic universe is characteristically non-
Christian for it has no beginning and no end. This 
means that the cosmology with imaginary time is 
in a serious conflict with Christian eschatology, 
as the progressive movement of time (kinesis) 
to its rest (stasis). The biblical view of time, in 
contrast to the neo-Platonic treatment of time, 
does not start from the universe as enclosed (that 
is, the universe existing as a totality, for example 
as a 4-dimensional spatial continuum), it rather 
reflects the awareness that time is the succession 
of the individual events connected with the 
divine economy in the world. This biblical 
understanding of time does not allow any theory 
of laws of time which underlie its empirical 
appearance through separate events. And this is 
in a strong contradistinction to the neo-Platonic 
view that the whole time can be described in 
spatial, overall terms. From here it is clear that 
the model of Hawking, if one treats this model 
ontologically, i.e. accepts that his imaginary time 
is real, so that the universe is closed, rather stands 
for the ideal of Greek cosmology and provides the 
“schemata” of history as the sequence of possible 
events stripped of the temporal flow.
If, however, we look at quantum cosmology 
as a model initiating the classical universe with 
a linear flow of time the whole evaluation of 
Hawking’s model can change. For in this case 
whatever was in the quantum temporal world 
can be treated as a kind of “typology” of what 
should happen later in the development of the 
universe in real time. In this case the reference 
to quantum state of the universe as to the “past”, 
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looses its strong sense; for from the “typological” 
point of view the history of the visible universe 
can be treated as initiated not from the imaginary 
“past”, but from the eschatological “future”. This 
implies, that the “transition” from the quantum 
universe to the empirical classical universe, as 
depicted in Fig 1, assuming intuitively that time 
is flowing to the top of the diagram, can be easily 
reversed as an upside-down diagram, where time 
is flowing down from the future.
The analogy which we used while talking 
about the quantum universe as the concise image 
of the history of the universe in real time, must 
not be transferred straightforwardly into the 
theological discourse of creatio ex nihilo, for we 
must remember that both the quantum universe 
as well the classical historical universe are both 
created and contingent upon the othereness which 
is responsible for their contingent facticity. What 
we wanted to articulate is the created nature of 
the universe, which is differentiated into the 
intelligible and empirical. From this perspective 
indeed the intelligible quantum universe as 
“giving origination” to the visible universe neither 
exist in the “past” nor in the “future” of the visible 
universe, it rather exists as the parallel, intelligible 
creation, which is articulated by the human being. 
In this the whole meaning of Hawking’s model 
changes completely, leading us to the conclusion 
that this model can hardly deal with the creation 
ex nihilo itself, but rather with the constitution of 
the latter through the articulation of the difference 
in the created world.
Quantum Cosmology and Metamorphosis  
of Kantian Antinomies 
In order to proceed in our treatment of the 
meaning of Hawking’s model from a philosophical 
and theological point of view, we should refine the 
notion of the ontological difference in creation as 
related to the Christian understanding of creatio 
ex nihilo. We recall the words in the beginning 
of the Christian Creed which affirm the belief 
“in one God, Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven 
and earth, and all things visible and invisible”. 
What is meant by things visible and invisible. Are 
these terms purely ‘technical’ words with no deep 
theological foundation, or, alternatively do they 
express the dichotomy in creation, its division into 
two distinct realms, which are both important in 
the context of religious belief? If the words of the 
Creed mark an ontological difference between 
two realms of the created being, what would be a 
proper theological explanation of this dualism? 
The affirmation from the Creed, which 
we quoted above, reflects the Christian 
understanding of creation ex nihilo: God created 
the world out of nothing in such a way that there 
was an initial distinction between two realms: 
the realm of intelligible forms and the realm of 
sensible reality. The intelligible realm is simply 
understood as the “spiritual”, “intellectual” level 
of created being. A good way of referring to this 
realm is as the noetic level of creation, or kosmos 
noetos. On this level God formed the angels , who 
have no material body. But this level contains 
also intellectual images of sensible reality, that is, 
ideas. This makes the noetic realm reminiscent of 
the world of Platonic ideas. Ideas as intellectual 
images of sensible reality are inevitable 
ingredients of scientific theories, so that it is 
arguable that scientific ideas have an immediate 
relation to the noetic realm which complements 
the sensible realm, that is, the material universe. 
The objective existence of the intelligible realm 
lies in the fact that it contains the community of 
living minds following from humanity’s ability 
to think, rationalize, memorize and symbolize 
the sensible creation in intelligible forms. The 
only thing which is not so easily grasped by the 
empiricist or positivist type of thinker, is that 
the world of intelligible forms has an ontology 
different in comparison to the ontology of the 
sensible realm. It is exactly at this point that some 
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modern scientific theories of the universe follow 
a naive assumption that their mathematical 
constructs have the same ontology as the objects 
which they suppose to describe.16 In theology, 
the ontological dualism between the realms of 
creation, proclaimed in the Creed, is, in fact, a 
structural difference in the unity of creation, 
which explicates this mystery from the side of 
creation. The dichotomy in creation in general 
has its particular manifestation in the constitution 
of human being, their composite hypostasis 
traditionally described in terms of body and soul 
(intellect). Theology asserts human uniqueness 
exactly as “simultaneous” (joint) existence on 
two levels of reality, so that only man can be a 
mediator between these levels and hence be a 
witness of their ultimate originary unity in the 
creation.17 
If one attempts to formulate the concept of 
creatio ex nihilo in cosmological terms, that is, in 
terms of the traces of creation in the world, one 
can argue that there is a structural element in the 
world, that is the difference between intelligible 
and sensible, which carries in itself what the 
Greeks called the logos (the underlying sense) of 
creation. In other words, the distinction between 
the sensible and intelligible can be used in order 
to affirm that the world is created with a particular 
sense. The Greek Fathers of Christian Church 
used the word difference as a cosmological, 
theological, term in order to articulate the creatio 
ex nihilo from within the world. This term comes 
as the translation of the Greek διαφορα′ (diaphora) 
(this term has theological contradistinction to the 
Greek word διαιρεσις (diairesis) which means 
division). It was Dionysius the Areopagite who 
used first the term diaphora, applying it to the 
differences of all things in creation18. Maximus 
the Confessor followed him and used the term 
diaphora, as a characteristic of created being, its 
constitutive and distinctive feature. The diaphora 
is the ontological feature of the created being, 
its constitutive element. This implies that the 
difference in creation will never disappear. It 
plays a constructive role in creation, because it 
provides a common principle of all created things: 
all things are differentiated in creation and at 
the same time the principle of their unity is that 
they are differentiated. In particular it provides a 
common principle for the unity of intelligible and 
sensible creation through its constitutive meaning 
in the creatio ex nihilo. From this perspective 
the issue of the creatio ex nihilo can never be 
separated from the issue of differentiation in 
creation between intelligible and sensible. The 
diaphora in God's creation is an established order, 
the principle of variety and unity in creation, 
which is distinct from the Creator. 
The immediate implication of the ontological 
category diaphora in creation, as applied to a 
scientific quest for the creatio ex nihilo, is that 
any physical or cosmological model trying to 
imitate the creatio ex nihilo in scientific terms, 
should deal with the fact that it is not enough 
just to produce a reasonable scenario of how the 
empirical visible (sensible) universe came into 
being from “nothing”; one should realize that 
there is a “parallel” creation of the invisible world, 
the world of intelligible forms or the noetic realm. 
But the theory of creation of the noetic realm 
would be quite problematic, because it assumes a 
theory of meaning, or a theory of the intelligence 
which is responsible for the models of the sensible 
creation in physics and their very articulation in 
the noetic realm. This demonstrates in turn that 
while providing the genesis of the physical picture 
of the world, one needs to appeal to realities which 
are not quantifiable in the rubrics of physics. One 
needs philosophy or even theology.
Science therefore can responsibly argue 
only for a “half” of creation (the empirical 
realm), assuming that the meaning of this “half” 
is provided from outside, from the noetic realm, 
which is not itself a subject matter of science (but 
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rather of philosophy and theology). The noetic 
realm is involved into the formation of scientific 
knowledge, so that it is this realm which is the 
guarantor of its expression and preservation, but 
the origin of this realm is not subject to science. 
Science uses logical laws and intellectual forms, 
but it does not give any account for the very 
possibility of this usage. In this sense science 
deals with being, but it does not produce the 
mechanisms of generation of being. As Heidegger 
was saying: science is not thinking yet! It is 
because of this that the maximum science can 
claim in the analysis of the genesis of the world, 
is that it found the mechanism of differentiation 
in creation between empirical (sensible) and 
intelligible (noetic) as seen from the sensible 
perspective. This results in the fact that the 
creatio ex nihilo is accessible through science 
only up to the extent of ontological differentiation 
in creation, but not as theological creation out of 
nothing. This idea can be illustrated with the help 
of the following diagram:
The quantum universe which is represented 
by the Euclidean 4-dimensional sphere stands 
here for the intelligible universe IU. The visible 
universe, which resembles the Pseudo-Euclidean 
space with a clear distinction between time and 
space, stands here for the visible universe VU as 
a part of the empirical realm. In contradistinction 
with Fig. 2, we treat IU and VU as ontologically 
distinct universes, so that instead of their literal 
matching (which happens in Fig. 2) and physical 
causation between them, we rather affirm the 
mechanism of their differentiation in creation, 
which by itself represents the constitutive element 
of creation ex nihilo in a theological sense. This 
means that instead of treating the model of 
Hawking as the model of creation out of nothing, 
we treat it as a particular theoretical scheme of 
the diaphora (difference) in being.
Now we come to the climax of our analysis, 
namely to the point where the dualistic scheme of 
realms in the world, as a structural element of its 
created nature, is to be subjected to the antinomial 
analysis in the style of Kant. Our objective at this 
stage is to trace that metamorphosis of Kantian 
antinomies, their mutual interaction, which 
is explicated in modern cosmology through 
Hawking’s model. Let us rearticulate the main 
strategy of our analysis. 
The pivotal idea of cosmology is to explain 
the observable cosmos. The idea of the universe 
as a whole is invoked in cosmology in order to 
operate mathematically with equations applied to 
Fig. 3. Interpretation of "creation" in Hawking's cosmology as constitutive differentiation between the intelligible 
and empirical universes
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the universe beyond the horizon of its visibility 
for us. Yet it is assumed that the universe, being 
a uniform continuum of matter and space-time 
at large is subject to a scientific grasp. This 
universe as a heuristic idea can be denoted as 
VU-visible universe. The specific features of this 
universe are supposed to be explained in terms 
of simple principles of unity, which provide 
the explanation for the whole variety of things 
in the universe, which seems to be completely 
contingent at first glance (this is the telos of 
cosmological explanation). The contingency 
of the observable universe becomes a final 
target of cosmology, which hopes to replace 
this contingency by some “necessary law” 
which itself will need no further explanation. In 
quantum cosmology it is believed that this kind 
of law should exist and it is sought in the remote 
past of the universe when classical physics must 
be replaced by a quantum description of matter 
and space-time. This implies that the universe 
which is observed by us here and now as a 
contingent state of affairs was not so in the past, 
that is, it followed a pattern of behavior which 
excluded the contingency of its further evolution 
and consequently its appearance to us as it is.
The fundamental difficulty with this attempt 
is that the law of the initial conditions of the 
universe, as we have discussed before, does not 
belong to the temporal series of causations in 
the visible universe VU, that is, by definition it 
transcends the universe VU. In Hawking’s model 
this transcendence is achieved explicitly by 
breaking the ordinary temporal series of causations 
in the VU, and by appealing to the modified state 
of affairs which does not contain time, that is, to 
the Euclidean 4-dimensional space which, being 
beyond temporal flux, and not subject to any 
origination, yet initiates the “classical’ universe, 
that is, the universe VU with the temporal flux. 
This primordial universe was qualified by us as 
the intelligible universe and denoted as IU. The 
invocation of the intelligible object IU in order to 
explain so to speak the empirical universe VU can 
become a subject of a criticism, analogous to the 
Kantian critique of the argument for the existence 
of absolutely necessary being. Since IU can not 
be found as an element of the empirical series 
in VU, its invocation as an explanatory element 
has sense only as a construct. This means that IU 
which is to explain the structure of the universe 
VU, in fact, departs from the field of empirical 
realities and the temporal series in the universe 
VU by acquiring the properties of the pure 
constructs. This is the logic of the transition in 
quantum cosmology from VU to IU: VU → IU. It 
is quite natural, for one ascends from the variety 
of data to a unified principle which is to explain 
this data.
The situation changes completely, however, 
when the transition from VU to IU is reversed, 
that is, when the quantum universe is now treated 
as a level of reality which is more fundamental 
than VU, giving rise to the visible universe from 
the underlying quantum structure. (This is the 
meaning of Hawking’s claim that the quantum 
universe with imaginary time can be more 
fundamental and genuine level of reality, whereas 
the visible distinction between space and time 
in classical universe is merely a figment of our 
imagination.) According to the logic of quantum 
cosmology, the transition IU→ VU describes the 
actualization of the visible universe VU out of IU; 
it, however, must be understood by us, in view 
of our interpretation of the quantum universe 
IU, as a causation in a conceptual space, invoked 
by the thinking intellect. This implies that the 
mechanism which actualizes the universe VU out 
of IU is itself treated by us also as a construct 
with the intelligible ontology.
We observe here a kind of intellectual inversion 
from causation originating in the temporal series 
(VU → IU), to causation originating in the purely 
intelligible series (IU → VU), the completeness 
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of which is based upon existence of an absolutely 
necessary cause (that is, the quantum universe). 
This jump in reflection is based on an inability 
to build the empirical content of the concept of 
the unconditioned condition (IU) in the series of 
empirical causes. According to Kant, however, 
from the structure of the visible universe VU 
one can not conclude via the empirical analysis 
to the existence of such a necessary cause (IU) 
which would not be contingent itself. And that is 
why one can state that there is no an absolutely 
necessary cause or being which would explain 
VU. This means that the quantum universe has 
no ontological references in the empirical realm. 
It exists as an intelligible object, which functions 
in thought only as the purpose of the logical 
justification of the theory of the visible universe 
VU as a contingent state of affairs involved in 
temporal flux. Hawking, as we have seen, believes, 
however, that IU has the same physical ontology 
as VU, and that is why the causation which brings 
VU into existence out of IU is sought as a physical 
law (we mentioned before that Hawking claimed 
that there must be laws of the initial conditions in 
the universe).
The clash between the realistic treatment of 
IU promoted by Hawking in spite of his generally 
positivistic metaphysics on the one hand, and the 
opposite claim on the same treatment following 
from a simple Kantian analysis, leads us to an 
antinomial puzzle, which points to the only 
justifiable formula for dealing with the situation; 
namely to treat Hawking’s intention to justify 
the visible universe as originated from quantum 
level, i.e. the transition IU → VU, as an example 
of antinomial reasoning, which is similar to the 
Kantian reasoning on an absolutely necessary 
being expressed in his Critique of Pure Reason 
in the fourth antinomy (A452-453/B480-481). 
The antinomy about the origination of the visible 
universe out of intelligible quantum universe can 
now be formulated as follows:
Thesis: There belongs to the world 
the quantum universe (Euclidean 
4-sphere) IU which provides the 
boundary condition for the visible 
universe VU, and whose existence is 
absolutely necessary for the visible 
universe VU to exist; and this is a causal 
condition for VU to be as it is.
Antithesis: There nowhere exists 
the quantum universe IU in the world, 
as the cause of the visible universe VU 
(there is no connection between IU 
and VU: they belong to the different 
ontological realms (intelligible and 
empirical) correspondingly). 
The appearance of such an antinomy in the 
discourse of origin of the universe is remarkable 
because, as we remember, the initial motivation 
of Hawking’s model was to overcome the 
difficulties associated with the first Kantian 
antinomy on the origin of the universe in time, 
that is on the beginning of the universe in 
time. What happened, as a result of quantum 
cosmology’s attempt to remove the problematics 
of the first antinomy, is very interesting: one 
detects a certain metamorphosis of antinomies. 
The overcoming of the first antinomy led with 
a sort of inevitability to the formulation of the 
antinomy of the origin of the universe not in 
terms of time, but in terms of the absolutely 
necessary being. This shift in the explication 
of the problem of origin of the universe 
has taken place not purely philosophically, 
but under the pressure of developments of 
cosmological theory. In other words, the very 
progress of knowledge suggested a concrete 
scheme of that how to explicate the intrinsic 
interconnectedness of the Kantian antinomies. 
This shift, as we argue, reflects some general 
patterns of scientific attempts to find the 
foundation of the world undertaken by human 
subjects. 
– 1773 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Problem of Creation of the World in Cosmology and Metamorphosis of Kantian Antinomies
Kant could use the antinomy formulated by 
us for a negative conclusion about the empirical 
evidence for the existence of an absolutely 
necessary being (IU) as a cause of the visible 
universe VU. His argument would be that the 
quantum universe IU belongs to the intelligible 
realm and does not have an independent 
ontological being apart from the thought, which 
brought the ideas of IU into being. However this 
conclusion constitutes nothing negative, for the 
antinomies, as puzzles for human reason, can 
be considered as natural difficulties arising in 
relating the ontology of the sensible world to the 
ontology of the intelligible world and vice versa; 
these difficulties point towards the limits of the 
human power of knowledge. However, one can 
go further and claim that the new explication 
of the fourth cosmological antinomy of Kant, 
in fact, refines the scheme of constituting of 
the very human cognitive faculties. Namely, 
this antinomy in its logical performance by 
reason, manifests the process of mediation 
between the sensible and intelligible worlds, 
performed by a human subject in virtue of that 
this subject is itself a complex of the physico-
biological and intellectual-spiritual, so that the 
mediation between the sensible and intelligible 
worlds happens within this human subject. Thus 
the structural similarity in the constitution of 
humanity and the universe is revealed: it can be 
formulated as that there is a common underlying 
principle (logos) which lies in their foundation 
and the content of this principle is that there is 
the ontological difference (diaphora) between 
the sensible and intelligible in both the universe 
and humanity. 
An interesting feature of modern cosmology, 
which is not a philosophical discipline, is that it 
reveals the unity of the human reason with respect 
to two realms in the created being. This unity is 
reveled through the transformation of the first 
Kantian antinomy (on the temporal beginning 
or eternity of the universe), into the fourth one 
(on the ultimate foundation of the world), the 
transformation through which the problem of the 
underlying foundations of the contingent facticity 
of the world is explicated in a new way. This fact 
demonstrates that cosmology is imbued with 
anthropology in the sense that its transcendental 
consciousness reveals the antinomial difficulties 
arising as soon as the understanding transcends 
the boundaries of experience and endeavors to 
speculate on the foundations of its own facticity. 
Taking this into account, cosmology can be seen 
not only as a natural science, but also as a human 
science, which narrates no so much about the 
external world, but rather about humanity and its 
place in the universe.19
The presence of antinomies in the 
cosmological discourse, where one attempts 
to speculate on the creation of the universe out 
of nothing in a theological sense, points to the 
fundamental difference in the contingent creation 
between the intelligible and sensible realms. 
It makes possible for us to guess whether this 
tendency of a split in theory between empirical 
realities and their conceptual images, if taken 
in its extreme, will always lead a scientist 
to the detection of the ultimate frontier in 
attempting to synthesize the variety of physical 
experience in a single principle of unity, namely 
to the unbridgeable ontological diaphora in 
the created domain. The mediation between 
intelligible and sensible, which is performed 
by a philosophizing cosmologists, and which is 
theologically justifiable, reflects the unification 
of the divisions in creation (that, is the division 
between intelligible and sensible realms) which 
take place not ontologically, but on the level of 
cognition.
The antinomial structure of the proposition 
about the causation between the intelligible 
quantum universe and the visible, combined 
together with our analysis of the intelligible 
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ontology of the quantum realm with an imaginary 
time, leads us finally to the conclusion that that 
quantum cosmology is dealing with differentiation 
in the contingent creation, that is, with the basic 
diaphora in creation, rather than with creatio ex 
nihilo in a theological sense. However, since the 
presence of the difference between the intelligible 
and sensible reflects a general tendency and 
specific feature of all scientific attempts, which 
try to provide the genesis of the attributes of the 
empirical universe in a single unified theory, it 
becomes evident that these scientific models are 
not theologically irrelevant in what concerns their 
particular schemes which allow one to detect the 
presence of the diaphora as a constitutive element 
of creatio ex nihilo. 
1 See, for example, Athanasius of Alexandria, Contra Gentiles 8, 34, 38, 40. 
2 This issue was a matter of interesting discussions in the papers of J. A. Wheeler in 1960-80s. The full bibliography can be 
found in his (Wheeler 1994, 351-4). 
3 “Dust” stands here for the uniform distribution of clusters of galaxies, which are treated as noninteracting particles (simi-
lar to the concept of the ideal gas).
4 The bibliography on inflationary cosmology is vast, so that the reader, for example, can refer to a recent book (Weinberg, 
2008).
5 A simple model of what has been said in the text can be found for example, in the papers (Gunzig et al., 1998, 2000). 
6 See (Tryon 1988). A detailed analysis of this model can be found in (Isham, 1988). 
7 E. Mc. Mullin points out that the position of Newton was a departure from the medieval Aristotelians who were not in-
clined to separate creation of matter and time (McMullin 1988, p. 44). 
8 There exist some models which attempt to model the pre-Big Bang state of the universe. 
9 Many leading cosmologists argue that the global initial conditions do not provide much use for conclusions about the vis-
ible universe. See, e.g. (Barrow, 1993; 1999, p. 26). 
10 By leaving aside all technicalities in this trick one must be said, however that the idea to geometrize time dates back to 
the developments of special relativity, where the unification of space and time in one complex was achieved through the 
concept of the interval between two events, which is usually treated as a metric, that is the device which allows one to 
measure distances between any events in space time, which is named as Minkowski space. The idea of geometrization of 
time was not received positively among philosophers: it is enough to invoke the name of A. Bergson, who in his famous 
book (Bergson, 1999) argued that this approach is philosophically damaging for taking into account various aspect of the 
reality of time. 
11 See details in (Hawking, Penrose, 1996, pp. 84-86).
12 See e.g. a good review paper of (Coule 2000). In this paper the healthy criticism of the creationist pretensions of quantum 
cosmology is developed. The author rightly affirms that the issues of “creation” is overstated in quantum cosmology and 
its aim is to provide “quantum determination of the cosmological state” rather than to claim the “creation”.
13 J. Horgan in chapter 4 of his book (Horgan,1996) discusses the implication of Hawking’s cosmological model in the con-
text of his claims about the end of physics as soon as the ultimate theory of everything will be built. Horgan accepts a view 
that cosmology in the form as it is developed by theoretical physicists like Hawking, departs from any experimental base 
(in comparison with astronomy for example). He calls this cosmology ironic rather than scientific, making a conclusion 
that the trend it takes in its extreme speculation provides not an end of science as ultimate knowledge of everything, but 
rather the “epitaph” for cosmology itself, as a scientific discipline.
14 Damascius offered an interesting geometrical analogy in explaining the nature of empirical time as the radiance which 
circles around the intelligible center, the unity of all time, which preserves the order of time in the empirical world. See 
(Sambursky, Pines, 1961, pp. 64-93). 
Intelligible time in this picture is the cause of the coherent continuity of the temporal flow. This makes the empirical 
time united with the intelligible one as the radii are united in the center of a circle. Damascius argues then that the whole 
time exists at once as all radii exist at once at the center of a circle. He then draws a conclusion that the whole time exists 
simultaneously in the same way as the whole space of the cosmos (it is interesting that this intuition is very similar to the 
spatialization of time as is often done in the context of the relativity theory).
The Hawking model with imaginary time offers something similar, for its finite universe covers the whole span of all pos-
sible real times in a single space-like structure, whose existence, according to Hawking, is not in the flux of time, it rather 
represents a hidden form of time, its encapsulated form.
15 The physical and mathematical problems which arise in this matching are discussed in Ch. 7 of (Hawking, Penrose 
1996).
16 See papers of (Tegmark 2008) and (McCabe 2004-2005). 
17 The idea that humanity acts as a mediator between divisions in creation was developed by Maximus the Confessor. See in 
this respect books (Thunberg1995), (Tollefsen, 2008).
18 See his The Divine Names, 5,8; The Celestial Hierarchies, 4,3,1.
19 This point was advocated in (Nesteruk, 2011).
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Проблема сотворения мира  
в современной космологии  
и метаморфоза кантовских антиномий
А.В. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг,
ПОРТСМУТ, РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В статье проводится философский анализ известной в космологии попытки моделировать 
сотворение вселенной из ничего. Модель квантовой космологии Хоукинга с мнимым временем 
анализируется в соотношении с идеями неоплатоников и представителей патристики. 
Анализ показывает, что современная космология представляет собой уникальный случай 
продемонстрировать трансформацию антиномической трудности, возникающей при попытке 
установить конечность вселенной во времени (первая антиномия Канта), в антиномию, 
сходную с четвертой кантовской антиномией об абсолютно необходимом существе. 
Сделан вывод, что космология не может моделировать творение мира из ничего, однако она 
позволяет уточнить и эксплицировать далее структурный элемент богословски понимаемого 
сотворенного мира, а именно онтологическое различие между областью умопостигаемых 
форм и областью видимых вещей. Делается также вывод о том, что космологические модели 
позволяют эксплицировать эпистемологические ограничения, возникающие при попытке 
смоделировать творение мира из ничего.
Ключевые слова: антиномии, богословие, вечность, время, вселенная, космология, 
пространство, различие, творение.
